After the “failed” experiment that was Ange-ball, Tottenham Hotspur turned their eyes to potentially a safer pair of hands in the form of Thomas Frank. Critics of the change might say Spurs have betrayed their attacking roots for something more conservative; proponents would perhaps declare the appointment a shrewd one, with the Danish manager’s tactical nous providing avenues to maximize Spurs’ squad and build on the foundations of what has come before.
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Frank’s reputation as an adaptable, creative manager precedes him, and that makes it difficult to predict how he will deploy his Spurs side; however, as Frank likes to say himself, he operates on a foundation of “principles”: ways of playing that permeate his teams regardless of a specific formation or structure.
With that in mind, we’re going to touch on a few of those principles, how they may be expressed on the pitch by Spurs, and how they compare to what we saw under Ange Postecoglou. To give us some guardrails, we’re going to focus more on a comparison with true Ange-ball - the very aggressive system we saw in Postecoglou’s first season, and the first half of last; as opposed to the more defensive (and less cohesive) 4-4-1-1 driven largely by injuries and a cup run (and win!).
Three vs. four at the back?
Though many are postulating that we could see Spurs return to a back three formation under Thomas Frank, Frank’s history suggests that will likely not be the case. Historically, Frank has largely preferred a back four, only playing a back three when he feels his side will be on the back foot. Brentford’s successful Championship promotion campaign in 2020/21 saw extensive use of a back four, before switching to a back three in Brentford’s inaugural Premier League appearance to ensure safety in the top flight. Since then, Frank has used the back four more and more, relying on a back three mostly against sides he perceives as stronger, with Brentford lining up in some variant of four at the back in 37 of their 43 fixtures in 2024/25.
As Spurs are one of the “Sky Six”, I think Frank would consider his team to have the upper hand in most matchups, and as such a back four will be the likely setup. This is where we start seeing some similarities between Frank and Ange. Frank last season tended to use a 4-2-3-1, slightly different to Ange’s 4-3-3 in that the Dane utilized a double pivot in buildup as opposed to a single #6; however, Frank’s #10 (typically Mikel Darmsgaard) routinely dropped deep to help progress the ball in a manner not too dissimilar to James Maddison in Ange-ball, and out of possession both coaches made use of two banks of four to defend.
Deep buildup
The similarities continue with both coaches preferring to build from deep. Though Frank has a reputation for more direct football, Brentford were actually among the top sides last season for touches in their defensive third and touches in their own penalty area, not afraid to knock it around while probing for an opening. The fact that the players are used to passing the ball around deep thanks to Ange-ball should allow them to adapt to Frank’s tactics quickly.
Where the tactics differ is in terms of the shape and how the sides use the buildup to create openings. We’re all familiar with that hexagonal shape that was something of a Postecoglou calling card: inverted fullbacks, a single pivot, and two advanced midfielders, with wingers high and wide. As referenced above, Frank’s tactics are somewhat more traditional, with fullbacks in classic positions, a double pivot, and a free roaming #10:
The quirk of Frank-tics (yes, I’m calling it that now) is the width of the center backs. This results in multiple passing channels for the goalkeeper, with both midfielders, center backs, and fullbacks potential options, with the #10 sometimes also available due to his movement. Unless the opposition is extremely aggressive with their press, this means Frank’s sides can play out calmly and without great risk - with Frank unafraid of his sides sending it long when passing lanes don’t open up.
It’s that invitation to press that again brings to mind Ange-ball; but again, there’s differences. Once Spurs pulled teams out of shape, they would prioritize playing in between the lines under Ange, quickly but methodically, to then further pull the defense out of shape and isolate attackers against defenders, especially in wide areas. Frank’s sides, on the other hand, are much more direct. Once they identify an opportunity, they go forward immediately, with either a quick one-two, or even a long ball in behind for the forwards. Instead of space between the lines, it’s space in behind that Frank targets.
Attack vs. defense
One regular critique of Ange-ball was how aggressive the Australian was in committing players forward. Postecoglou would often have both fullbacks attacking the box, resulting in scenarios seen a handful of times where one fullback would pass across the face of goal for the other to score. Occasionally, an alternative scenario might see both attacking midfielders push into the box (in which case, one of the fullbacks might sit deeper in cover). This typically meant an attacking shape in which six players were committed to the attack, with four covering in defense:
This 4-6 setup generally worked well for Spurs’ attack, with sheer force of numbers sometimes overwhelming defenses; but it often left Spurs exposed on the counter. Spurs are very lucky to have two extremely good center backs: one an elite and aggressive defender in the shape of Cristian Romero, and the other an athletic freak in the form of Micky van de Ven, and both did an extremely good job of covering in this shape, which was no mean feat. Unfortunately, when the starters were unavailable the cracks started to show. This structure also heaped pressure on the #6, with that player both required to cover huge amounts of ground and display extremely good decision-making, with a single moment or choice sometimes the difference between Spurs being back on the front foot or an opposing attacker through on goal.
Thomas Frank, on the other hand, consistently sets up with a 5-5 in the attacking phase, and isn’t afraid to use more of an asymmetrical structure. He will often keep one of his fullbacks a bit deeper, and his #8 has a key role - covering for his fullback on the other side attacking the box (often in an underlapping fashion similar to Ange-ball) but not being afraid to press forward, either to support the attack or break up a counter. The running required in this role could suit somebody like Pape Matar Sarr quite well.
This means less is required of both the center backs and the #6: the #6 can be more of a shield, shuttling attackers into less dangerous areas, and able to double up with the defenders without worrying about attackers running free in behind with that additional cover providing an extra level of safety.
Crosses or cutbacks?
Ange Postecoglou wasn’t a huge fan of crosses. His football was predicated largely on creating high quality chances, and as a general rule, crosses aren’t the best way to do that. That said, against a bunkered defense Postecoglou’s Spurs could at times struggle for ideas. His ideal attack required possibly just a little much in the way of individual brilliance, with the winger roles key: they would either use their technical ability to beat their marker and get to the byline, or they would feed the runs of either the fullback or midfielder to do the same - at which point, you would see a cutback to one of multiple players who had crashed the box.
Unfortunately, this level of individual brilliance isn’t exactly commonplace across the Spurs squad, and teams would start to double up in the wide areas. This resulted in endless recycling of the football across the 18-yard box, probing for openings. At times this worked, but if opposition sides were patient and well-structured, they could hold firm with minimal effort and wait for a mistake before countering.
Frank’s attacking methodology is somewhat different. As referenced above, rather than keeping the wingers high and wide before pushing to the byline, he likes them to start in a similar position but make angled runs into central areas while long passes are played from deep, exploiting space behind the defense. This puts them in positions where they can either shoot, or make a simple pass across goal for a tap-in.
Like with Ange-ball though, this only really works well if you can lure out a team and create that space. If the opponents keep their structure, however, Thomas Frank likes to use crosses - both as a chance creator and as a way of varying the attacking patterns to keep opposition defenses guessing.
But wait - didn’t I say crosses aren’t a good way of creating quality chances?
Yes, but not all crosses are created equal. Frank prioritizes crosses from the half-space or just on the corner / edge of the 18-yard box. The Athletic did a really good breakdown on crossing threat around five years ago, and the long and short of it is that the most dangerous crosses are from these areas:
These are exactly the areas from where Frank likes his sides to cross (the byline / cutback area notwithstanding) - something we rarely saw under Ange Postecoglou - and Frank’s sides cross a LOT, so that will be a big change this season.
The thing is that his sides are smart about it: they don’t just hit and hope from the touchline, but instead work possession into areas where skilled passers and crossers can take advantage. This is why I believe somebody like Dejan Kulusevski could work extremely well as a Frank winger: no, he’s not the pacey type to run in behind, but he is elite at working his way into these spaces and exploiting them. It’ll also play up the skills of the likes of Son, Pedro Porro, and James Maddison.
It will be nice to have a bit more of a Plan B that doesn’t just involve throwing more numbers forward.
There’s change afoot this season; but perhaps not as much as one may think. From my research and assessment of Frank’s sides, I’d say it’s likely Spurs will retain a back four, and prioritize building from the back much like they did under Ange Postecoglou. When Spurs push forward though, expect to see both more variety in attack AND a slightly more conservative structure, ensuring defensive solidity is not compromised.
Who really knows with a coach like Thomas Frank, though - he may completely revolutionize both his tactics and this Spurs squad - and prove me wrong as soon as tomorrow’s first preseason friendly against Reading. I’m excited to find out either way.