The decision to dismiss Ange Postecoglou as Tottenham Hotspur manager over the summer, following the clubs UEFA Europa League triumph, was certainly controversial.
Despite an unprecedented 22 Premier League defeats, Postecoglou had ultimately ended Spurs’ 17-year trophy drought.
That would certainly lead to Postecoglou being the man to lead Tottenham into the UEFA Champions League, right?
Daniel Levy had other ideas and landed first-choice managerial target Thomas Frank from Brentford in June.
This appointment is intriguing, given that it is the Danish coach’s first ‘top’ job after previously managing Brentford, Brøndby, and Denmark’s youth sides.
Frank has enjoyed a very promising start at the helm in North London.
Spurs applied themselves very well in the UEFA Super Cup defeat to Paris Saint-Germain before thrashing Burnley 3-0.
One of the clearest changes in this new-look Tottenham is the much more considered approach to set-pieces, with Frank reaping the rewards when his side scored from two of them in the PSG defeat.
This tactical analysis will examine Tottenham Hotspur’s attacking corner tactics under Thomas Frank, as implemented in recent competitive fixtures.
This Tottenham Hotspur set-piece analysis will highlight common issues exploited against zonal marking and man-marking defensive systems.
Thomas Frank Set-Piece Tactics & Principles
No side in the Premier League scored more headed goals than Thomas Franks Brentford last season, with the West London side also recording the highest average shot quality from corners in the division.
So, how exactly does Thomas Frank make his sides so effective from corners, and how has this already been translated to Tottenham?
Frank frequently urges numerous players to flood the penalty area, assigning his most physical players to make varied movements aimed at unsettling zonal marking systems.
From as far back as his Brøndby days, his teams have crowded the box on every corner, with their movement and shielding tactics typically enabling his attackers to register the first contact on the ball.
A major contributing factor to his Brentford sides scoring so many goals from corners was his ability to continually change over time to avoid being too predictable.
One interesting setup from last season involved Brentford overloading the back post before sharply attacking the front, creating confusion in the defence.
The ball would be crossed to the front post, where the Brentford players often were first and scored.
Frank is, by all accounts, a percentages man who severely disapproves of his players shooting from distance in open play, so its unsurprising that his players are placed in high-probability scoring zones (like the near post or penalty spot), forcing defenders into reactive marking and increasing chances of first contact.
Franks corner routines also often feature a blocking system, in which his players deliberately impede defenders to free up space for key runners.
These blocks disrupt man-marking and create clean lanes for attackers to meet the delivery with momentum.
Generally, the runners follow tightly coordinated movements; some arc their runs to pull defenders out of position, while others time late bursts into open zones.
These rehearsed patterns are designed to carve open the opposition structure and exploit mismatches in the box.
Thomas Frank Set-Pieces At Tottenham Hotspur
Thomas Frank’s attacking corner routines at Spurs already reflect his Brentford blueprint.
Frank has brought his data-driven set-piece philosophy to North London, emphasising strict positioning, coordinated movement, and the desire to win the vast majority of second-ball scenarios.
Early signs suggest Tottenham are adopting similar principles: using blockers to disrupt man-marking, flooding key zones, and choreographing runners to disrupt the defensive line.
If the aim is to create separation and disrupt defensive structure, giving his attackers a clean run at the ball, then his side have certainly achieved that overall in Franks opening months at the helm.
During this pre-season win over Arsenal, in which Pedro Porro almost scored a sensational Olimpico, Tottenham had six to seven men inside the box, with two more deployed on the edge to pick up loose balls from clearances.
It would be both lazy and insincere to suggest that this structure is merely flooding the box; Franks method is a calculated way to control both the initial delivery and the aftermath.
Tottenham hugely maximised their chanc