How Tottenham play: Set-piece progress, more clean sheets but problems in possession

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This is part three of a series on The Athletic taking the tactical temperature at each of the Premier League’s ‘Big Six’. How have each side evolved this season, what are they doing well, and what are the issues — if any — that need fixing?

Part one, on Manchester City, is here, part two on Arsenal is here.

Thomas Frank’s appointment at Tottenham Hotspur in the summer was warmly welcomed by many. A tactically versatile manager with a proven track record at Brentford of improving young players, there was hope that the Dane taking over this Spurs squad would be an ideal marriage.

Instead, the season is unravelling.

Tottenham have won just two of their past 12 league games to sit 14th, and are out of both domestic cups. They are 11th in the Champions League with two of the eight league-phase rounds to play and should make the knockout phase’s play-off round at least, if not qualify direct for the round of 16 via a top eight finish, but there is limited belief that they can make a truly deep run in Europe’s elite club competition.

What has Frank changed in comparison to predecessor Ange Postecoglou, who left the club in June days after winning the Europa League final but also with his team having limped home fourth-bottom of the Premier League, and what issues are they facing? The Athletic breaks down Tottenham’s playing style in 2025-26.

Problems in possession

A key feature of Frank’s Brentford teams was their willingness to go long towards their forwards in a bid to move the ball quickly. That has been evident under him at Tottenham too, with 12 per cent of their passes travelling 35 or more yards, the club’s highest share of long balls in the past eight seasons.

The example below from the 2-1 defeat by Liverpool in December is one instance of this build-up pattern working. Goalkeeper Guglielmo Vicario goes long towards midfield, where Archie Gray diverts the ball to Rodrigo Bentancur. Randal Kolo Muani pins Ibrahima Konate, while the positioning of Brennan Johnson and Lucas Bergvall prevents Liverpool’s defenders from pushing up.

Bentancur then finds Kolo Muani, who turns away from Konate and can dribble forward, with Johnson’s run dragging Virgil van Dijk and Milos Kerkez away to clear a path.

This sequence ended with Kolo Muani’s deflected shot striking the crossbar.

Spurs have sometimes used their No 9 to make out-to-in runs to generate the momentum to leap and meet long balls.

In the example below, from the 1-0 defeat of Crystal Palace a week on from that Liverpool match, Richarlison rushes in from the left to meet a Vicario long ball. Bergvall and Kolo Muani are in position to attack the second ball, with Gray and Bentancur placing themselves to help a set rest defence.

Prospective new arrival Conor Gallagher, who was often deployed out wide at previous club Atletico Madrid, should prove a handy addition in this regard — but more on him later.

The concerns for Spurs with this approach have come when shifting between styles, another trademark of Frank’s Brentford teams.

Within games, they have occasionally focused on circulating possession before going long to try to find runs in behind. But in doing so, Tottenham often leave themselves unprepared to win second balls, opening up space for opponents to exploit.

This example from the 0-0 draw at Brentford on New Year’s Day comes after Bentancur and centre-backs Cristian Romero and Micky van de Ven exchanging passes for over 20 seconds without getting anywhere.

Bentancur’s tendency to drop between the centre-backs means Joao Palhinha is double-marked, and Brentford’s compact shape removes Pedro Porro and Gray as options. Djed Spence inverting from left-back drags Michael Kayode forward but Keane Lewis-Potter is quick to fill the gap.

Bentancur finally plays a forward pass to Spence, who is pressured by Kayode and passes back. That triggers Jordan Henderson to press Bentancur, and he hurriedly goes long towards Wilson Odobert on the left wing.

When Lewis-Potter intercepts this pass, he has both space to operate and four team-mates up ahead in position to attack at pace.

Spurs have sorely missed a progressive passer in midfield, with James Maddison and Dejan Kulusevski yet to play a league minute in 2025-26 because of injuries. Bergvall, Gray and Pape Matar Sarr (currently away at the Africa Cup of Nations) offer quality ball-carrying, but are not incisive passers. Summer signing Xavi Simons’ adaptation to the Premier League has been slow.

Tottenham rank bottom of the league for through balls attempted with just 11 in their 21 games. Among the division’s 160 teams over the past eight seasons, their 0.5 through-ball attempts per 90 minutes would rank 144th.

Frank has attempted to fill the void in different ways, primarily by instructing his central midfielders to make wide support runs to drag opposition defenders out of position. In the reverse fixture against Brentford in early December, a 2-0 home win, Simons’ run from midfield to the right wing drags Sepp van den Berg away from the centre and leads to Richarlison scoring from his cross.

Johnson, who transferred to Palace at the start of this month, got a similar goal in the 2-0 win at Manchester City in August, with Sarr playing Simons’ role to nod the ball on to Richarlison.

When teams shift responsibilities on the fly, like Kayode and Lewis-Potter in the fixture at Brentford, Tottenham struggle to break teams down. The prolonged absence of Dominic Solanke, a striker skilled at dropping deep to link up play, has been felt as much as those of Maddison and Kulusevski. (Solanke finally returned from an early-season ankle injury that required surgery in the final minutes of Saturday’s 2-1 FA Cup defeat by Aston Villa.)

This also means Spurs revert to predictable long-ball patterns when teams sit deep against them.

The Porro-Mohammed Kudus axis effectively accounts for half of their six most common progressive pass zones, as seen below.

Porro has played 134 forward passes to Kudus this season — no other Tottenham duo has more than 50. Similarly, Porro and Kudus have exchanged 147 passes within the final third. The next most common combination among Frank’s squad has been Simons and Kudus, who have exchanged just 41 passes.

After a bright start following a summer transfer from West Ham, Kudus has slowed down with just one goal and one assist in his past 12 league games. Opponents have doubled up on him or prevented him from receiving the ball in dangerous areas.

Kudus will not have an immediate chance to rebound to his early form either, having sustained a thigh injury in the recent 1-1 draw with Sunderland that could keep him out until March at least.

That troublesome home form

Spurs’ ball progression struggles have played a part in their contrasting home and away form, too.

As the table below shows, their goals and points per 90 are much better away from home, with the team playing at a quicker pace and going long more often with less possession. They press more intensely and dominate territory at home, but with no penetrative passer in the side, visiting teams have frustrated them by using low blocks and forcing Frank’s men to be the catalysts.

Away from home, Tottenham began the season with wins against Manchester City, West Ham, Leeds and Everton. But in recent weeks, hosts Bournemouth and Nottingham Forest both scored early against them and then sat back, with Spurs averaging more possession and losing both games.

Their only other loss on the road when managing less than 50 per cent possession came against league leaders Arsenal, who beat them 4-1.

An over-reliance on set plays?

In the absence of consistent attacking output higher up the pitch, set pieces have become Spurs’ primary weapon — a reversal from the Postecoglou era.

As the graph below shows, this is the most reliant Tottenham have been on dead-ball situations in eight seasons.

Spurs have scored 11 times from corners this season (joint-most in the division with Arsenal), using a mix of strategies.

One of these has been to send their initial delivery towards one post or the other and then guide the ball into the middle of the goal area, where players pin their opponents and crowd out the goalkeeper, or shoot directly.

Ben Davies’ goal against Sunderland below was a result of Romero moving out from the six-yard box to the back post to nod the ball back to Van de Ven, who was unmarked as his team-mates packed the six-yard box.

From the left, Spurs have often delivered corners directly into a six-yard box filled with bodies. Van de Ven’s goal against Everton in October saw him score from right in front of goalkeeper Jordan Pickford.

While their threat from set pieces has increased, Spurs are averaging fewer corners won per 90 than they did last season (5.2 vs 6.4). Becoming more dynamic from open play will help them get into positions to earn more corners, with Arsenal a standout example of the success that brings.

Defensively, Tottenham have conceded just twice from corners, after allowing 10 goals at them last season. Their approach has often been focused on protecting the near-post zone with three men. Richarlison and Porro have often taken up this role along with a midfielder, giving the team an outlet to counter-attack with when they win the ball.

The man-markers in central zones can be manipulated on occasion into dropping into the six-yard box, leaving the area around the penalty spot open. Spence, while by no means short at 6ft 1in (185cm), has often had to mark forwards or centre-backs who are taller than him, too.

But Spurs’ overall organisation has negated those concerns admirably.

Some out-of-possession positives

Frank’s tactical flexibility has been more evident on the defensive side. Tottenham have kept seven clean sheets in their 21 league matches, already one more than their tally in the 38 of 2024-25.

They don’t tend to press too high but often work on locking up the midfield areas, with the back four largely staying flat and closer together than they did under Postecoglou. That has contributed to Spurs facing just 11.5 shots and 3.95 shots on target per 90, their lowest and second-lowest rates respectively in the past eight seasons.

Some bad habits from 2024-25 have carried over, however. They have made 25 errors leading to a shot or goal, on track to eclipse their 41 last season, their 4.7 possessions conceded in their defensive third per 90 is second-worst in the division behind only Villa (5.2) and they have conceded five times from these giveaways, joint-most alongside the Wolves team who are propping up the Premier League with only seven points from 21 games.

When their opponents are in possession, Spurs’ defending is often ball-focused, leaving them susceptible to blind-side runs — an issue that also plagued them under Postecoglou.

Eli Junior Kroupi’s goal for Bournemouth last week is an example of this. As the ball is worked to the right, Kroupi and Marcos Senesi move into the box without being tracked. The cross then goes to Senesi, who squares for Kroupi to score.

A starker example of Tottenham’s out-of-possession flaws came in that FA Cup loss to Villa.

As seen below, Unai Emery’s visiting side pass through the lines of pressure far too easily, forcing Van de Ven to step out. Donyell Malen then dribbles into that space, dragging Porro and Kevin Danso with him, before feeding goalscorer Emiliano Buendia.

Situations like these require individuals to adjust and take responsibility on the pitch. Spurs have players capable of doing so, but their over-eagerness to win the ball or close down the player in possession often sees them leave their assignments.

Romero and Van de Ven have often pushed out of the back line, with Bentancur dropping in to cover that space. But when opponents attack at pace, those rotations are harder to implement, and Tottenham have been punished.

How could Conor Gallagher impact this side?

Gallagher’s arrival should help fill the void created by Bentancur’s hamstring injury. The 25-year-old is a battling central midfielder who can crash both boxes, with his work rate across multiple areas of the pitch standing out in his two years at Atletico.

Comfort in defending space in the wide areas and central zones will prove useful, especially if Spurs commit more to the direct route.

While he is not the progressive passer this team need, Gallagher’s player radar from his final season at Chelsea shows he has useful attributes. Featuring in a fast-attacking, transitional side, he ranked highly in creative threat, ball retention and link-up play, while scoring five goals and assisting seven more in 37 league appearances.

Perhaps most importantly, Gallagher is always available — he is yet to miss a game due to injury in his senior career.

The green shoots of improvement detailed here and Spurs being only six points off fifth-placed Brentford are reasons for optimism heading into the second half of the season. But Frank and his players have plenty to do to salvage a campaign that has gone awry and win over an understandably frustrated fanbase.